Web studies explored citizens' concepts of their duty and their choices concerning actual policies.
Introduction
Democracy is a wonderful tool, but citizens may not know how to use it for its best purpose. I argue here that it is best suited for advancing the public good, the good of all. It is less well suited for advancing the interests of a group when it is in conflict with outsiders, and even less well suited when the group is a single person who tries to use political participation to advance self-interest.
Yet citizens do not always understand these features of the system in which they participate. They fruitlessly try to use their political influence (small as it is) to advance their self-interest or the interest of a particular group. There are better ways to advance self-interest, such as participation in a market economy. And the desire to advance a group's interest is, arguably, fragile and difficult to defend when the group's interest conflicts both with self-interest and with the good of all (Baron, in press ). (If the defense of group interest does not conflict in one of these ways, then it is equivalent to defense of self or all.)
Partly as a result of this lack of understanding, democracy fails to realize its full promise. If people thought of their right of participation as an opportunity to advance the good of all, then the general good might be advanced more than it is now. This argument is similar to that of Caplan (2007) , who argues that democracy suffers because voters do not understand economics. I argue here that they do not understand democracy as well as they might. Elsewhere I have described other sorts of errors, biases, and misunderstandings that lead to outcomes that are less good than they could be (Baron, 1998 (Baron, , 2010 Baron, Bazerman, & Shonk, 2006 ). Downs (1957) pointed out that voting, or, more generally, political participation, is irrational when viewed from the perspective of narrow self-interest. From a self-interested point of view, the expected benefit of voting is the probability of being the decisive vote multiplied by the benefit to you if your side wins. In a large election, the probability of being decisive is very small and is approximately proportional to (but smaller than) 1/N , where N is the number of voters (Edlin, Gelman, & Kaplan, 2007 , 2008 . Even if the benefit to you is $1,000,000 if your side wins, with 100,000,000 voters the expected benefit is less than one cent. Political scientists have thus concluded that people vote, and participate in politics, for other reasons than rational pursuit of narrow self-interest. People are either irrational or they have other goals, or both.
The point of politics
Yet voting can be rational from a utilitarian perspective, which considers benefits to all those affected, not just the voter. Assume first that the number of affected people is the same as the number of voters. And the vote is about the provision of some public good that will benefit everyone, such as an improvement in the environment. Then, while the probability of being decisive is proportional to 1/N , the total benefit to everyone is proportional to N . When we When you participate in a market, you have a direct effect on your self-interest. You buy things mostly because the benefit to you is in some sense worth the cost. When you participate in politics, the benefit accrues almost entirely to others.
Still, people sometimes use market participation to express political concerns, such as buying "green" or "ethical" products. They could do this for two reasons. First, the chosen products really might do less harm or more good than the alternatives. Undoubtedly this is usually a small effect (Baron, 1997) . Second, buying a product is like a vote for whoever makes it. In a free market, a sufficiently small number of votes will put a producer "out of office", that is, out of business, while a lot of votes will lead to expansion. This sort of expression may be seen as a form of political action combined with an act that is primarily done for self-interest. The increased cost of the better product may be relatively small, like the cost of voting. The existence of a market mechanisms for political action may influence how people think about political action more generally.
I have described the value of democratic participation in terms of provision of a public good that requires sacrifice of each person. Much of government can fit this model. For example, a major function of government is enforcement of laws that prevent people from harming each other. The sacrifice we must make for this purpose, and many other government functions, is to pay taxes. But we do not have to pay them voluntarily. We can, instead, engage in an action that is much less costly than paying taxes, namely, voting for a government with the power to tax us to pay the police.
Yet much of politics is not obviously about the provision of public goods, and many political debates concern whether government is attempting to provide too many public goods or which of several possible goods should be provided. If the government is overreaching, then it is a pubic good to reduce its reach. Likewise, if it is trying to do one thing and should be doing something else, then it is a public good to push it to change. Citizens who think about the good of all thus can see whatever policy they end up favoring as the provision of a public good. Citizens who think about the good of all will often disagree, and then we must hope that the majority is more often correct than incorrect.
I assume here that, other things being equal, the good of all is more likely to be advanced, the more people who try to advance it, even when they disagree about how to do that.
Parochialism
Another goal is to advance the good of a group that includethe citizen. The group could be a profession, an age group, an ethnic group, a religion, or a nation. I shall use the term "parochialism" to refer to this sort of limited altruism. 1 Nationalism, action on behalf of a nation, is the most typical. The smallest possible group contains only the self, although most people seem to take "self" to include immediate family.
Parochialism in this sense is often harmless. Many policies that benefit a nation, for example, do not affect foreigners much, or even help them indirectly. Thus, limited altruism leads to the same preference as altruism for all: it helps some and harms none, so it helps on the whole. The danger is that this neglect of outsiders can lead people to support policies that benefit insiders but harm outsiders enough so that the harms exceed the benefits. This can happen even when a citizen must sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the group (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1990 Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Baron, 2005, in press; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008, in press ). These results are found both in laboratory games in which the payoffs are monetary and in hypothetical scenarios concerning actual policies.
Parochialism is not the same thing as competition. The goal of competition is to increase relative advantage of the in-group over the out-group. Parochialism as studied so far seems to concern "in-group love" rather than "out-group hate" (e.g., Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008, in press ).
Some parochialism is partly the result of cognitive failures. People think, "What helps my group helps me, because I am a member of my group. Therefore, my own self-sacrifice helps me." Again, they fail to do the arithmetic to see that cooperation with their own group is a net loss for themselves as well as for everyone (counting outsiders). When people are forced to calculate how much (that is, how little) they get back from their own contribution to the group, and how their contribution affects outsiders, they are less inclined to contribute to help their group when the contribution is costly both to contributors and outsiders (Baron, 2001) . But this is only part of the story. Parochialism survives even when the individual is excluded from the group benefit, so that the sacrifice yields nothing in return (Baron, 2010) .
Parochialism is difficult to defend as a moral choice. The problem is that groups may be arbitrarily defined, and it is difficult to produce a reason why we should favor one group and not a broader group that includes it (Singer, 1982 ). Yet at least some forms of parochialism are not choices so much as biological motives, particularly when the group is the family. (Thus, in this paper I define "self-interest" as including immediate family.) Although such motives might extend to groups such as nations or races, I have argued that racism and nationalism are more often the result of cognitive abstractions (Baron, in press ). When people are encouraged to see foreigners as individuals rather than "Chinese" or "Mexicans," parochialism is reduced. Presumably, seeing one's child or spouse as an individual rather than a "family member" would have no such effect of reducing altruism toward the child.
Other moderators of parochialism
A few other factors can reduce or moderate the effects of parochialism. First, consider a situation where two or more groups, each with strong group loyalty, are all voting on the same set of proposals or candidates. Examples are Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, or Shiite and Sunni Muslims in Iraq. In a system of plurality voting, each group would (parochially) vote for its own candidate, and the group with more votes would win. A moderate candidate who tried to appeal to both groups would lose because each voter would prefer the group candidate to the moderate. In approval voting, each voter would approve or disapprove each candidate. Many Catholics would approve both the Catholic candidate and the moderate, and many Protestants would approve both the Protestant and the moderate. Because the moderate gets votes from both sides, she might get the most votes and therefore win, as demonstrated by Baron et al. (2005) . Of course, as the two examples suggest, opportunities for this solution are rare.
They could increase if international agreements were put to a vote in all affected countries. (Israel and Palestine come to mind.) Second, as I just noted, parochialism is reduced when decisions are presented as affecting individuals. For example, in one study (Baron, in press ), subjects were told: "Imagine that you live in the U.S. You work for a company with one other branch in the U.S., nearby and in the same state, another branch in China, and one in India. . . . Sometimes the company gets opportunities to invest money in ways that will generate income immediately. When this happens, (in press) argues that groups are seen as abstractions rather than real people, and it is easier to think parochially about abstractions.
Third, parochialism is much greater for harmful omissions than for harmful acts. We are very reluctant to harm outsiders through our actions, but many people consider it as acceptable to harm them by doing nothing to help. For example, in a similar set-up to that just described, the omission question was: "If you contribute $100, the next person and 12.3% for foreign in the action case, almost no difference, but was 12.0% and 28.4% in the omission case, a large difference (t 72 = 3.49, p = .0008, for the interaction). Whenever we can present "doing nothing to help" as active harm, parochialism might be reduced. 
Duty
People appear to have moral intuitions that are explicitly non-utilitarian. That is, they support options other than those that appear to do the most total good (Baron, 2010; Sunstein, 2005) . It is possible, though, that people think that following intuitive rules will in fact bring about the most good. The clearest way to show that people do not justify their intuitions this way is to ask them about consequences, as well as about their moral judgments. Thus, conflicts between moral judgments and judgments of the best overall consequences are clear evidence of non-utilitarian moral heuristics.
People feel that it is their moral duty to support their group, even when they themselves say that this goes against the interests of outsiders and their own self-interest (Baron, 2010; Baron, Ritov & Greene, submitted Citizens have a duty to help their fellow citizens before helping others."+yn(8)+
People have a duty to help those in need, wherever they are."+yn(9)+ People have a duty to help citizens of other nations when their own governments cannot or will not provide the needed help.
A citizen has a duty to support policies that are best for him or her personally. Figure 1 shows the results for several different proposals. The first two reasons were the most strongly endorsed, but they do not explore thoroughly the thinking behind these endorsements. The endorsement of the last reason, concerning self-interest was higher than some other reasons.
In the rest of this article, I report five new studies that explore other reasons for perceived duty and the apparent duty that people sometimes feel toward defending their self-interest. The first study examines why people sometimes do not define their duty in terms of advancing the good of all. The fact that they do not see their duty this way is the starting point for asking about other concepts of duty, namely, defense their nation or themselves. Specifically, the first study examines the possibility that advancing the good of all, even when that conflicts with national good, is a kind of betrayal of the purpose of giving people the right to vote. Since this right is given by a national government, people might think of the purpose as serving the nation.
The remaining studies examine self-interest voting in particular, and they examine national voting as well, building on the research described earlier. They show that a norm of self-interest voting exists and can even be seen as a moral obligation. The last two studies ask about the particular sorts of policies that are supported when people see themselves as defending their self-interest. In general, self-interest voting is associated with opposition to taxation, and (somewhat less clearly) to opposition to government in general, including government spending.
Ultimately I suggest that the perceived duties to defend self-interest and group interest have similar roots, as might be suggested by the illusion I described in which group-and self-interest are confused. Underlying both concepts of duty is a social norm of self-defense, which is extended to defense of one's group when group members think that their self-interest depends on the interest of their group.
Considerable evidence suggests that self-interest plays only a small role in voting and political attitudes more generally (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1991) . The phenomenon described here may still be worth exploring. First, many of the studies of self-interest use objective measures of self-interest such as whether the citizen's children will be bused to a more distant school to achieve racial balance, finding that ideology is a more important predictor of attitudes. 
Study 1
Perhaps people view utilitarian voting as a kind of subversion or betrayal (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003) . We get the vote in order to protect the interests of the unit that gave it to us, but then we use it to advance someone else's interests. From a utilitarian perspective, betrayal has the disadvantage of discouraging the granting of such rights.
If (for example) we give people the right to own guns in order to defend themselves, and then they use the guns for unprovoked aggression, people will want to put limits on the original right. Yet, in the case of voting, this issue is relatively minor, as the vast majority of voters acquire the right to vote by place of birth, not by decision to grant that right. Moreover, the opportunities for such betrayal are rare. (A possible example, is climate change legislation, for those who believe that a carbon tax is bad for the U.S. but good for the future of the world.)
Study 1 tested the idea of betrayal in the context of giving the vote to immigrants, a clear case in which suffrage is the result of a decision rather than a default. Subjects saw brief scenarios about how a new voter had decided to vote.
The voter chose the interests of another country over the U.S., the interests of the world over those of the U.S., or the interests of the voter over those of the U.S. Questions asked whether people who think as the voter thought should be given the vote, should choose to vote as opposed to not voting, and should vote as the voter did, assuming that they voted. The main comparison of interest is between the government's choice of granting the right to vote and the voter's choice of which way to vote. If people think that "betrayal" is acceptable, they could give different answers to these questions, in the direction of thinking that it is wrong to grant the right to vote but acceptable to use the vote for a personal purpose once it is granted.
Method
Subjects in this study and all other studies reported here were from a panel of about 1200 adults who did studies for pay, typically on the order of $3 for a study expected to take 15 minutes. The panel was created over a period of 15 years, first by advertisements and then by word of mouth and search engines. I send invitations to 400 at a time and close the study when abou 80 have responded. The studies are programmed in client-side JavaScript. They typically involve an introductory page, then several pages each with a case and several questions about the case, all of which must be answered before going to the next page. The order of the pages is randomized for each subject. The panel is mostly Americans and is typical of the U.S. in age distribution (except that all subjects must be at least 18), education, and income, but with females vastly overrepresented. In this study, the 88 subjects had a median age of 45 (range: 23 to 72), and 67% were female.
Each of 16 proposals, one to a page, began with "X is voting in an election in the U.S. for the first time, after becoming a citizen. X thinks that the main issue in the election is . . . ", followed by issues of three types. In the first type (4 pages), a voter who sided with his or her perception of the interest of a particular other nation against the U.S.
In the second type (4 pages), a voter sided with the world against the U.S. In the third type (8 pages), the voter voted so as to benefit him or her, against the U.S. Here are examples of the three types:
• a proposal that would increase military aid to Israel. X thinks that the proposal would be bad for the U.S. but good for Israel. X is now a dual citizen of the U.S. and Israel, and in this case he feels more loyalty to Israel, so he votes for the candidate who favors the proposal.
• a tax on carbon fuels in the U.S. X thinks that the tax would be bad for the U.S. but good for the world on the whole because it would reduce the harm caused by global warming, harm that would fall mostly on other countries. X votes for the candidate who favors the tax.
• a tax on carbon fuels in the U.S. X thinks that the tax would be bad for the U.S. but good for X because she in the solar energy business. X votes for the candidate who favors the tax because it is good for X.
The questions following each item were as follows, with the gender of the voter matched to that of the subject (female in the examples):
Do you think that the rules should allow people like X to get the right to vote? * Yes, thinking this way is the way that new citizens should think.
* Thinking this way is not a good recommendation for citizenship, but this should not be the only factor. Table 1 shows the percent of disapproval of any sort as a function of the type of decision -giving the right to vote to the immigrant, choosing to vote at all, and choosing how to vote -and the three types of items. Recall that in all three item types the voter voted against the interest of the U.S. It is apparent that, if one is to go against the U.S., the best case to do that is when one votes for the good of all. Voting on the basis of self-interest or the interest of a particular other nation elicits more disapproval. Table 2 shows the percent of negative answers to the question about reasons as a function of the decision type and the reason (averaged over item types, which showed only small differences). Voting for the self was the worst reason, but voting for the good of all people was worse than voting for the nation (p < .02 or better for all tests across subjects or items). Thus, although voting for the good of all is not seen as terrible, it is on the average worse than voting for one's nation.
Results
Of primary interest is the close agreement among the three decision types. And of these, the decision to grant the vote and the decision of how to vote are of greatest interest. (It might be argued that the decision of whether to vote is somewhat dependent on whether the decision of how to vote can be made, and the latter is what voters think about.)
Of particular interest is the very small proportion of cases in which granting the vote to someone who would vote for the good of all was considered bad while the choice of voting this way was considered good (4.3%, as opposed to 1.1% with the reverse discrepancy). The corresponding results were similar for voting for self (5.5% and 1.6%, respectively).
Subjects also differed in their attitudes. Out of the 88 subjects, 60 showed no difference between voting for the good of all and voting for the nation, as good or bad reasons, both in choices about granting the vote and in how to vote; 18 found voting for the good of all to be worse for both kinds of decisions; 3 found voting for the good of all to be better in both kinds of decisions; and, importantly, only 7 subjects showed any discrepancies, none of which were reversals in direction. The correlation coefficient between [number of cases in which voting for all was a bad reason minus number of cases which voting for nation was a bad reason] for the two decision types (granting the vote and deciding how to vote) was .96.
Although this study was not designed to assess endorsement of self-interest voting, I should note that many subjects thought it was a good reason for choice of how to vote. Subjects were more stringent about granting the right to vote, but this could result from a general belief that the standards for national loyalty for new citizens should be high.
In sum, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that reasons for choosing how to vote should be consistent with reasons for granting the vote. What the present results do not show is a causal effect of the latter on the former.
Study 2
Although Study 1 provide little evidence of a norm favoring self-interest voting when it is pitted against national interest, the study of Baron, Ritov, & Greene (submitted, and described earlier) does provide some evidence for such a norm. Studies 2 and 3 examine this norm more closely by asking about the morality and rationality of voting on the basis of self-interest.
The question of rationality arises because people may think of voting for self-interest as a rational way to promote their self-interest, even though economic analyses disagree strongly with this conclusion. One test of this possibility is to examine the effect of making voting costly: in a modification of each scenario, the voter has forgotten an absenteed ballot and must pay an additional $100 in order to get home in time to vote.
Of particular interest is the possibility that voting is influence by a norm of self-interest (Miller,1999; Ratner & Miller,2001 ; see also Wilkinson-Ryan, 2008) . According to this social norm, it is embarrassing to act altruistically, to the point where people even justify altruistic actions by claiming that they are really self-interested.
The study also explored further the nature of parochial voting in favor of the U.S.
Method
This study used two types of items, with three examples of each type, and it asked about the morality of voting on each side and also of not voting. One type pitted world interest versus U.S. interest, for example: "Jim thinks that the main issue in the election is a tax on carbon fuels in the U.S. Jim thinks that the tax would be bad for the U.S. because of its effects on the economy, but would be good for the world on the whole because it would reduce the harm caused by global warming, harm that would fall mostly on other countries."
The other type pitted self-interest against world and U.S. interest (although not strongly), for example: "Betty thinks that the main issue in the election is a tax on carbon fuels in the U.S. Betty thinks that the bad effects of the tax on the world and U.S. economy would slightly outweigh its long-term benefits in reducing global warming, but it would be good for her because she in the solar energy business."
Each proposal was followed by twenty questions, spread over two pages, with a reminder of the proposal on each page:
For the first few questions, imagine that the voter is home and can vote with little difficulty.
Rate the morality of each of the following options for Barbara.
Barbara decides not to vote.
completely immoral immoral neither moral nor immoral moral but not best best (or tied for best) The 83 subjects had a median age of 46 (range 20-73) and were 63% female. Table 3 shows the answers to the questions about duty. For proposals that pitted the world against the U.S., most of the responses favored the U.S., e.g., 37% thought it was the voter's duty to vote against a proposal that the voter saw as good for the world but bad for the U.S. Importantly, for the items pitting self-interest against both U.S. and world, a substantial number of responses (32% for the voter's duty) thought that there was a duty to support self-interest. Note that the subjects had the option to say that there was no duty, and many did so, but about a third of responses saw not just a right but also a duty to vote in favor of one's own interest.
Results
Results were similar for the questions about morality. In fact, subjects differed in the relative morality they assigned to world vs. U.S. or self vs. both, and these differences were correlated with corresponding differences (for minus against) in the duty judgments in Table 3 . For the world items, the correlation coefficient was .50, and it was .33 for the self items (both significant at p < .002, one tailed). Subjects differed not only in the magnitude of these effects but also in their direction. The association was present when only the direction was considered and all subjects with 0 differences were removed (Fisher test: p = .0499 for self, .0002 for world, one tailed). Table 4 shows the mean difference scores scores for the questions about beliefs, including the morality questions just discussed. Of greatest interest here are the results for self-interest in the self items. People in this sample do tend to think that it is in their self-interest to vote for proposals that are in their interest (mean of .68), even when it is costly to do so (.67; the difference was not significant). And they think that not voting is not in their interest (-.26), even when voting is costly (-.22, not significantly different from -.26), although they do think that not voting is less immoral when it is costly (-.09 vs. .00). In general these results support the account of self-interest voting in terms of the belief that voting is in fact an efficient way to advance one's self-interest.
Study 3
The next study examined several possible reasons for self-interest voting: the idea that it yields the best outcome, that it is consistent with the reasons for granting the vote, that it expresses a norm of self-interest, and, in particular, that each person should defend himself because nobody else will. The study includes reasons for voting for the good of all. Each of four scenarios pitted self-interest against the good of all.
Method
Each subject saw four pages, one with each of four cases. The introduction to the study read: This is about reasons for voting in a congressional election in the U.S. Each page describes the situation facing a voter, who is a U.S. citizen and votes in the U.S. About 200,000 people are expected to vote in the voter's congressional district. All the cases concern a tax on carbon fuels (oil, gasoline, coal, etc.) .
The idea is to reduce global warming in the future.
The cases differ in the voter's opinion about whether the tax is good or bad, and in whether the voter has other people (family) depending on her.
The election promises to be close, and it is not clear who will win. It is also not clear what will happen to the tax, in congress, after the election.
In two of the four cases, the voter thought that the carbon tax would be a good idea but bad for her. (All were female, with different names.) In the other two cases, the voter thought that the tax was a bad idea but good for her.
Within each of these pairs, the cases differed in whether the voter had dependents.
One good-idea condition case read: "June thinks that the main issue in the election is a tax on carbon fuels in the U.S. June thinks that the tax is a good idea on the whole because of its long-term benefits in reducing global warming.
But the tax would be bad for her because she is a heavy user of oil. June is single with no children and does not plan to have any. Nobody works for her, and she does not plan to hire anyone." For the dependent condition, the voter was married with two children.
For the bad-idea condition, the case read (after the first sentence): ". . . thinks that the tax is a bad idea on the whole. She thinks that its bad effects on the world and U.S. economy would slightly outweigh its long-term benefits in reducing global warming. But the tax would be good for her because she holds a patent on a technology that would be used for generating electricity from sunlight." This case also had two versions, with and without dependents. The questions about each of the four cases, with criteria for scoring in brackets, were:
Test question: If Betty's view is correct, which option is best for her long run self-interest? If the pro-tax candidate wins by one vote, and she votes for that candidate, she will regret it.
[Reverse scored and analyzed only for good-idea items (where the tax is bad for her), because it makes no sense for the bad-idea items.]
If voters vote according to their view of what is best on the whole, then the best policies for all are likely to be chosen.
[Reverse scored for bad-idea items, where she thinks the tax is bad on the whole.]
Citizens are given the right to vote in order to defend their own self-interest.
[Reverse scored for good-idea items, where the tax is against her self-interest.] Citizens are given the right to vote in order to help decide what is best on the whole. The 93 subjects used had a median age of 47 (range 22-73); 65% were female. Seventeen additional subjects were omitted because they answered the test question at less than 50% correct (not counting "It doesn't matter"), and 27 of the 93 subjects had missing data for the first question about reasons because of a programming error (leaving 63 for this question). Table 5 shows the percent of endorsements of the various reasons for voting on one side or the other. All reasons were endorsed more often than not when they were appropriate.
Results
In addition, all reasons correlated appropriately with perceived duty. To test this, I used a mixed-model logistic regression, with the appropriate duty as the dependent variable and each reason as a predictor, along with a fixed effect for the identities of the four items and a random effect for subject. All predictions were highly significant (coefficients Table 5 : Percent of yes and no answers about reasons for voting on the side of self-interest. "Yes" favors the side that agrees with the question, e.g., self-interest for the first item, and favoring the tax for the second.
Reason Yes No
If X does not look out for her own interests, nobody else will. 52 11 She will benefit from a reduction in global warming.
63 12 If voters vote according to their self-interest, then policies that are best for the majority are likely to be chosen.
20
If the pro-tax candidate wins by one vote, and she votes for that candidate, she will regret it. 38 10 If voters vote according to their view of what is best on the whole, then the best policies for all are likely to be chosen.
25
Citizens are given the right to vote in order to defend their own selfinterest.
47 19 Citizens are given the right to vote in order to help decide what is best on the whole. 49 28 above 1, z's above 2.4). The dependent variable was a duty to vote for self-interest, or a duty to vote against selfinterest for reasons that concerned the good of all, except for the question about whether the voter would benefit from a reduction in global warming, in which case it was a duty to vote for the tax. Of course this reason was another test of the role of perceived self-interest.
In sum, this study provides additional evidence for a self-interest norm. One expression of this norm is the idea that one must defend oneself because nobody else will. Another justification is that voting for self-interest yields the best outcome. Finally, there is additional support for the idea that voting choice should be consistent with the vote is granted.
The presence of dependents had no consistent effect.
Study 4
The next two studies were designed to find out the policy concerns of citizens who thought of voting as defending their self-interest. The simplest possibility is that they would be opposed to taxation, because paying taxes is by its nature an act of self-sacrifice for the general good. I initially expected that self-interest voters would also favor government spending, because it was in their interest to benefit from spending. Putting these preferences together, they would end up favoring deficits.
In Study 4, however, the opposite appeared to be the case in terms of spending. Self-interest voters were generally opposed to spending as well as taxation. They were thus generally in favor of smaller government, although the pattern was not so consistent with spending as with taxes. In hindsight it is easy to understand this result, as I shall explain. For one thing, everyone is affected by most forms of taxation, but spending policies typically benefit only a minority in the case of each policy, e.g., students, the unemployed, etc. Study 5 replicates the result with improvements. Accordingly, I will report Study 4 briefly and then move to Study 5. Concerning this proposal, do think that people affected by it need to defend their interests through voting? yes no not sure
Results
I eliminated the 15% of responses when the subject answered the first question, about understanding, "no" or "not sure." Figure 2 shows the correlations between voting for a proposal (yes scored as 1, no as −1) and answering the second to last question, the one about whether citizens have a duty to vote in their self-interest. It is apparent that self-interest voting is correlated with voting against tax increases, in favor of tax cuts, in favor of spending cuts, and against spending increases. The three main exceptions to this pattern, labeled 1-3 in Figure 2 , are, respectively:
"Legalize marijuana and tax it as much as possible without creating a new black market"; "Eliminate the Veterans Administration Medical Centers (which include the hospitals)"; and "Increase U.S. funding for border enforcement of illegal immigration by $100 per citizen per year." The first of these did not replicate in Study 5, and I will discuss the other two in that context.
Despite the exceptions, the correlations are significantly higher for the 12 cases that involved less government (mean 0.11) than for the 12 cases that involved more government (−0.14; t 22 = −3.2725, p = 0.0035, for the difference). The result also held for individual differences. I formed an index of voting for smaller government for each subject by adding the pro-small-government votes (1 for pro-small-government, 11 for anti-small) the 24 relevant issues. This index correlated, across the 78 subjects, with subjects' mean endorsement of self-interest voting (r = 0.37, p = .0007). Finally, a mixed-model analysis treating both subjects and cases as random effects (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) predicted voting as the dependent variable (for or against the proposal) from the self-interest duty question, a small-government code (1 or −1) for each proposal, and the interaction of self-interest duty and smallgovernment. The interaction was significant, indicating that small-government had more of an effect on the vote when self-duty was endorsed (coefficient 0.13, p = .0001 using Markov-Chain Monte Carlo sampling as described by Baayen et al.) A similar interaction was found between self-interest duty and the subject's perception of self-interest of the proposal, in predicting voting (coefficient 0.09, p = .0018). In the same analysis, self-interest duty had the opposite interaction with perceived benefit to the U.S. on the whole (−.10, p = .0001).
The question about defending self-interest (the last question) yielded similar results to the question about duty, but the interaction with small government was not significant, although the interaction with perceived self-interest was significant (.10, p = .0036), as was the interaction with perceived U.S. interest (−.09, p = .0036).
3
The need for an additional study was suggested by the unexpectedly high endorsement of the self-duty question:
78% of the answers were yes, and only 13% were no. Possibly this high rate resulted from the fact that the question gave no other possible justifications. In addition, only 57% or the responses to the question about the budget were correct according to my own classification; 14% were reversed.
Study 5
Accordingly, the next study tried to clarify the presentation of the proposals and also included a test question. If the subject got the test question wrong, an alert encouraged the subject to re-consider. The idea was to prevent the subject from going on without giving the correct answer, but this devices failed for most subjects, so "errors" were still made.
(The results were indistinguishable as a function of whether it failed or not.)
Method
I used data from all 100 subjects who did the study (31 males, 69 females; median age 44, range 23-76); some had missing data, however. Despite the exceptions, as in Study 4, the correlations shown in Figure 3 are significantly higher for the 12 cases that involved less government (mean 0.04) than for the 12 cases that involved more government (−0.18; t 22 = −4.0295, p = 0.0006, for the difference). The result also held for individual differences. The index of voting for smaller government for each subject, computed as in Study 4, correlated, across the 100 subjects, with subjects' mean endorsement of self-interest voting (r = 0.34, p = .0006). Finally, a mixed-model analysis, treating both subjects and cases as random effects, with voting as the dependent variable, found a highly significant interaction (p = .0001) between coding for "small government" and the duty question; that is, small government had more effect on the vote (in the direction of voting for smaller government) when a duty to support self-interest was endorsed. A similar interaction was found between self-interest duty and the subject's perception of self-interest of the proposal, in predicting voting.
Discussion
Both self-interest voting and parochial voting may share a similar heuristic or norm, the idea of responsibility for one's own defense. To some extent, elements of the "culture of honor" may exist in most citizens, even those outside the American south. The idea of a responsibility for self-defense is consistent with self-interest voting and with parochial voting. Indeed, these may be seen as related (as suggested by the findings of Baron, 2001 ). Rarely are self-interest and parochial voting in conflict.
4
Like other heuristics, the norm of defending self-interest may extend to a situation where it is inappropriate. In this case it is not totally useless, but almost. As I argued earlier, the expected effect of a single vote on the voter is much too small for rational justification, without taking into account the effect of the vote on others. Even a parochial vote typically has an effect that is too small to justify action, especially when the action itself has costs to the self (Baron, Bazerman, and Shonk, 2006) .
5
The present argument is consistent with other results and claims in the literature. For example, Nannicini et al.
(2010) recently argued that "social capital," which they measure through prevalence of voluntary blood donation in a district, is associated with voting in the general good, as measured by punishment of corrupt politicians at the polls.
The authors suggest that, in my terms, both parochial and self-interested voting would reduce such punishment, as many voters would consider the favors that the corrupt politicians had done for them or their group. Of course, voluntary blood donation could also indicate altruism toward others outside of one's particular group; the beneficiaries of such donations are generally unknown to the donors. Baron & McCaffery (2008) found inconsistent attitudes about taxes and government spending. Most of our subjects 4 One possible case is one used in Study 3 here, in which self-interest arises from owning a particular type of business that would benefit from a proposal. It is unlikely that a business owner would want to engage in parochial defense of her competitors, but she would favor her self-interest. This argument does not deny that such owners can join together to promote their mutual self-interest. 5 Political action in favor of a group might be more effective in the case of protests designed to gain publicity for a cause.
(from the same panel as the studies reported here) favored lower taxation and lower government spending in general.
But, when they were given an exhaustive list of the major categories of government spending and asked to adjust the spending in each category upward or downward to match what the spending level should be, they adjusted some of the categories upward, with the result that total spending was essentially unchanged, even though the subjects still favored lower taxes. The overall pattern is like that in Studies 5 and 6 here for the subjects who endorsed self-interest voting.
There are of course other factors that distort voting behavior away from the utilitarian ideal. One is the existence of moralistic values (Baron, 2003 (Baron, , 2010 . People try to impose values on others through their political behavior, even when these values are not shared by others and when those doing the imposing admit that the consequences would be worse.
A related idea is that people engage in expressive voting, in which they try to express their moral beliefs (including moralistic values) or their group loyalties without regard for consequences (Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Brennan & Hamlin, 1998) . Expressive voting is "much more like cheering at a football match than it is like purchasing an asset portfolio" (Brennan & Hamlin, 1998) . As Brennan and Lomasky point out, one difficulty with this idea is that it is inconsistent with the very small number of votes for third-party candidates who cannot win, even when the support for those candidates in opinion polls is much higher. The idea has also not fared well in experimental tests (Tyran, 2004; Baron, 2010) . Moralistic voting is not simply expressive. People engage in it because they hope it will have real consequences. They really want the law to follow their moral intuitions, even when they are in a minority. (Some may hope to build a movement even if they lose a particular election.)
Note that the nature of self-interest and parochial voting is separable from, but related to, the question of why people vote at all. It has been known for some time that self-interest does not usually justify voting, no matter how one votes. People may not realize this. They may also vote out of a moral duty to vote. The decision to vote can be made for different reasons from those that justify the choice of how to vote. And the decision to vote is not the main issue I have discussed here. However, I have presented some evidence that the decision to vote is related to the choice of how to vote, in that people want to see the latter as consistent with the reasons for the former, and, in particular, with the reasons they were given the right to vote in the first place.
Of course, even if everyone voted for the good of all, they would not necessarily maximize utility, because they could make errors in their judgments about what is in fact in the general good. Some of these errors are random but others are systematic. For example, Caplan (2007) presents evidence that people systematically misunderstand or underestimate the power of some basic economic principles, such as the power of incentives to shape behavior or the benefit of comparative advantage. (Baron & Kemp, 2004 , provide supporting evidence concerning comparative advantage.) People also tend to isolate proposals, thinking only about their immediate or intended effects and neglecting secondary effects or unintended but inevitable side effects (McCaffery & Baron, 2006) . For example, they favor taxes on business over taxes on individuals until they think through the question of who will actually pay the business taxes.
Yet it is often the case that the policy that is the best for all is fairly clear, and people still favor parochial policies or policies that are in their self-interest. Climate change is one such issue (except for those who truly do not believe that more should be done now to prevent its bad effects). Other issues are not even "on the table" because it so obvious that they are political non-starters. Many examples of this are greater support for world government in various forms. Many problems in the world are the result of insufficient contributions to international public goods such as police agencies to prevent terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction, information networks concerning the state of natural resources, and medical research. Other problems are the result of lack of coordination among nations, and the lack of international agreements. Many such agreements are prevented because the relevant international agencies, such as the World Trade Organization, are concerned with a narrow range of issues, thus making log-rolling across issues much more difficult.
I have suggested here that one major impediment to the adoption of proposals that advance the good of all is that people misunderstand their roles as citizens. They fail to understand that political behavior is an extremely inefficient (indeed, wasteful of time and money) way to advance narrow self-interest and a moderately inefficient way to advance group interest, compared to its efficiency at advancing the good of the largest possible group. There are other, better, ways to advance self-interest and group interest. People would achieve their goals better if they devoted more of their time and money to what was most efficient at achieving each goal.
In the case of group interest when the group is a nation, one difficulty is that people may see voting for the good of all as a betrayal of national loyalty, as suggested by Study 1. Note that, in this study as in all studies reported here, individual differences are substantial. It is thus possible that people would be able to adopt a different attitude. They might be able to think of voting and other forms of citizen participation as a simple opportunity to do good, whatever the origin of this opportunity. The right to vote is not analogous to a charitable foundation, where the donor may specify what ends the foundation is allowed to achieve and the adminstrators are constrained by the donor's wishes.
The right to vote is granted without strings attached.
Can we change the norms about when different kinds of action are effective and appropriate? Can people understand these efficiency arguments? I am optimistic. These arguments are not that difficult, and they are essentially not made. People do not hear them. They are absent from high-school civics or government courses, from most college courses about political science, from the new media, and from political discourse itself, including campaigns and speeches of politicians in office. Thus, before we attribute people's lack of understanding to some sort of inherent cognitive limitation, we ought to see if people can, in fact, learn.
